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INTRODUCTION

Almost everyone has heard a horror story concerning the in-
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competence of a doctor.' These stories range in severity, from a
doctor misdiagnosing a minor ailment to a doctor removing the
wrong limb.2 However, these failures occur more frequently than
most people would like to believe. 3 It is estimated that up to fifteen
percent of the nation's doctors are incompetent and should not be
practicing medicine. a Therefore, patients encountering such doctors must have access to the lejal system in order to seek relief for
the harm committed by them. In the case of Lindberg v. Health
Partners, Inc.,6 however, the Minnesota Supreme Court set the recent trend of valid medical malpractice' claims being dismissed on
1. E.g., Susan Miller, Two Feet of Mistakes, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 27, 1995, at 60,
available at 1995 WL 14496980 (telling of some of the errors committed by doctors).
2. Id. The Newsweek article describes some of the serious mistakes that doctors have made. Id. A doctor working at a hospital in Tampa, Florida accidentally
amputated the wrong foot of one of his patients. Id. At that same hospital, 11 days
later, a therapist confused the identity of two patients and removed the respirator
of a patient who was depending on the respirator to breathe. Id. The patient died
shortly after the respirator was removed. Id. In Michigan, a surgeon mistakenly
removed the wrong breast of a woman with breast cancer. Id. An example of a
less serious mistake made by a medical clinic is presented in another Newsweek
article. Mediation Before Malpractice Suits? For Patients, Litigation Is Expensive And
Hard To Win. The Case For Trying Talking Instead Of Suing NEWSWEEK, March. 27,
2000, at 84, available at 2000 WL 7524673. In this article, a 3-year old girl punctured her hand on a used hypodermic needle, which was carelessly left in reach of
the girl, "leaving an inch long trail of blood." Id. The girl did not infect any diseases. Id. Furthermore, the girl's mother dropped the pending law suit when the
doctor offered her an apology and told her how the office had been improved to
prevent repeat occurrences. Id.
3. Miller, supra note 1. According to a 1990 Harvard study of the occurrence of medical malpractice in New York, 4 percent of the 30,000 patients were
injured by their physician, and 14 percent of that group died. Id. Furthermore, in
a 1994 issue of the Journal of American Medicine, it was reported "that deaths
from medical malpractice are the equivalent of 'three jumbo jet crashes every two
days."' Debra A. Dixon, The Legal Pitfalls Of Medical Practice,INDIANAPOLIS STAR,
June 20, 1997, at A15, available at 1997 WL 2888816. Medical malpractice has become the third leading preventable cause of death, surpassing breast cancer and
AIDS. Id.
4. Shirley Qual, A Survey of Medical Malpractice Tort Reform, 12 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 417, 426 (1986) (discussing how many doctors are incompetent and how
rarely they are actually sanctioned).
5. It has been suggested that plaintiffs need to have easy access to litigation
because the medical industry fails to discipline itself, and malpractice claims
brought by injured patients are the only way to keep incompetent doctors from
continuing to practice. Miller, supranote 1. "Between 1986 and 1992, state medical boards disciplined only 1,070 physicians for negligence or substandard care."
Id.
6. 599 N.W.2d 572 (Minn. 1999).
7. Medical malpractice is defined as:
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technicalities."
This note addresses the sufficiency of affidavits required by
Minnesota Statute section• 145.682
as interpreted by the Minnesota
9
Supreme Court in Lindberg. In this case, the plaintiff brought a
medical malpractice claim against her health clinic pertaining to
the death of her unborn son. The plaintiff, a pregnant woman,
had experienced chest pains and had called her health clinic to report her discomfort." The clinic did not instruct her to come in
until it was too late and the child had died. 2 At that time, the
plaintiff brought a medical malpractice claim against her clinic for
failing to instruct her to seek medical treatment. 3 However, the
Minnesota Supreme Court dismissed her claim, finding that the
second affidavit required by Minnesota Statute section 145.682,
which stated that her case has been reviewed by a medical expert,
was insufficient."' In reaching such a conclusion, the Minnesota
Supreme Court narrowly interpreted Minnesota Statute section
145.682 and is setting the precedent for valid medical malpractice
claims to be dismissed without receiving their day in court to be

[flailure of one rendering professional services to exercise that degree of skill and learning commonly applied under all the circumstances in the community by the average prudent reputable member
of the profession with the result of injury, loss or damage to the recipient of those services or to those entitled to rely upon them....
In medical malpractice litigation, negligence is the predominate
theory of liability. In order to recover for negligent malpractice, the
plaintiff must establish the following elements: (1) the existence of
the physician's duty to the plaintiff, usually based upon the existence
of the physician-patient relationship; (2) the applicable standard of
care and its violation; (3) a compensable injury; and, (4) a causal
connection between the violation of the standard of care and the
harm complained of.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 662 (Abr. 6th ed. 1991). The elements needed to establish a prima facie case of medical malpractice in Minnesota are, "(1) the standard
of care recognized by the medical community as applicable to the particular defendant; (2) that the defendant departed from that standard; and (3) that the defendant's departure was a direct cause of the plaintiff's injuries." Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 762 (Minn. 1993) (citing Plutshack v. Univ. of Minn. Hosp.,
316 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 1982)). For a general discussion of Minnesota medical
malpractice, see JOHN F. EISBERG, MINNESOTA MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, (1990).
8. Infra Part V.A.
9. Infta Part III.C.
10. Lindberg,559 N.W.2d at 574.
11. Id. at 573-74.
12. Id. at 574.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 578.
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decided on their merits.1
This case note first examines the history of medical malpractice and the events directing the Minnesota legislature to enact
Minnesota Statute section 145.682.16 The note goes on to explain
Minnesota Statute section 145.682," and then examines Minnesota
cases interpreting this statute.' 8 Part III examines the facts, the majority's analysis, and the dissenting opinions of the Minnesota
Court of Appeals and the Minnesota Supreme Court in the Lindberg
decision. 9 Part IV analyzes the implications from the Supreme
Court's holding in Lindberg° and makes suggestions as to how the
statute should be interpreted by the courts 21 or modified by the leg22
islature.
Finally, this note will conclude that the Minnesota Supreme Court interprets Minnesota Statute section 145.682 too narrowly, which will deny valid medical malpractice cases in the
future.23
II.
A.

HISTORY

The Emergence Of Medical MalpracticeStatutes

The first medical malpractice suit in the United States was
brought in 1794.24 However, it was not until the 1930's that the
number of claims against doctors began to significantly increase. 21
Medical malpractice claims continued to become more common in
U.S. courts until reaching a peak in the 1970's, when there were so
many claims that chaos ensued. 26 It was said that there were ap15. Infra Part V.A.
16. Infra Part II.A.
17. Infra Part II.B.
18. Infra Part II.C.
19. Infra Part III.A-D.
20. Infra Part IV.A.
21. Infra Part lV.B
22. Infra Part V.C-D.
23. Infra Part V.
24. Qual, supra note 4, at 420 (discussing the development of medical malpractice claims). The first medical malpractice claim in the United States was
Gross v. Guthery, 2 Root 90 (Conn. 1794). Id. at n.10; see alsoW.John Thomas, The
Medical Malpractice "Crisis": A CriticalExamination of a PublicDebate,65 TEMP. L. REv.
459, 460 & n.6 (1992) (discussing the evolution of medical malpractice). In this
case, the plaintiff sued a surgeon for "unskillful, ignorant, and cruel" surgery,
which caused the death of his wife. Id. (quoting Gross, 2 Root at 90-91). The
plaintiff was awarded 40 pounds in damages. Id. (relying on Gross, 2 Root at 91).
25. Qual, supra note 4, at 420.
26. Id. at 420-21; see also David W. Feeder, II, When YourDoctor Says, "You Have
Nothing to Wory About, "Don't Be Sure: The Effect of Fabio v. Bellomo on Medical Mal-
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proximately "five malpractice suits filed annually for every 10 doctors."27 As the number of malpractice claims escalated, the price of

medical insurance soared in an attempt to insure doctors against
the increasing instances of litigation." Furthermore, doctors began
practicing "defensive medicine," which required them to perform
unnecessary tests in an attempt to avoid future medical malpractice
claims.2 9 With the increasing price of medical malpractice insurance, many doctors could no longer afford to practice medicine,
leaving hospitals with a shortage of doctors. ° Others refused to
practice as a protest against the extremely high price of medical
malpractice insurance, and many did not want to take the risk of
performing surgery.31
In an effort to remedy the rising cost of medical insurance,
almost every state has enacted legislation designed to limit the
practice Actions in Minnesota, 78 MINN. L. REv. 943, 947 (1994) (noting the increase
of medical malpractice claims in the 1970's); Thomas, supra note 24, at 460 (recognizing the general havoc caused by the increasing amount of medical malpractice litigation); Are Lawyers Burning America?, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 20, 1995, at 32,
availableat 1995 WL 14496936 (characterizing the increase in torts claims after the
World War II as "the litigation explosion"). There are conflicting statistics as to
what level the number of medical malpractice claims actually rose. Thomas, supra
note 24, at 478-482. The Insurance Service Office estimated that the number of
medical malpractice claims could have increased at a rate between 20 percent or
30 percent higher than in previous years. Id. at 478.
27. Alarm over malpractice;the A.M.A FearsA Crisis In Claims And InsuranceCosts,
TIME, Jan. 28, 1995, at 75, available at 1985 WL 2366604; see also supra note 26 and

accompanying text (suggesting that there is not a definitive statistical report
documenting the increases in medical malpractice).
28. Kenith J. Halleland & S. Olivia Mastry, Health Right: ElicitingHealth Care
Reform, BENCH & B. MINN., Aug. 1992 Vol. 49 No. 7, at 14, (providing a general
overview of the need for medical malpractice in Minnesota); Qual, supra note 4, at
420-21 (calling this phenomenon the "crisis of availability").
29. Theodore R. LeBlang, Medical Malpractice and Physician Accountability:
Trends in the Courts and Legislative Responses, 3 ANINALS HEALTH L. 105, 115
(1994) (stating that "eight out of ten physicians practice defensive medicine in an
attempt to protect themselves from being sued," adding between $4 billion to $25
billion every year to the costs of health care); Thomas, supra note 24, at 463-65
(stating that defensive medicine "does not serve the patient, but functions only to
provide a defense in case the patient makes a claim"); Gene Koretz, Want to Cut
Medical Costs? Put A Lid On MalpracticeSuits, Bus. WE., May 13, 1996, at 32, available
at 1996 WL 7614388 (defining defensive medicine as, "prescribing tests and treatments with little or no benefit in order to ward off lawsuits").
30. Qual, supra note 4, at 421.
31. Doctors Aren't Above the Law, Bus. WK., Apr. 22, 1985, at 120, available at
1985 WL 2073274; Stopping the Bloodbath in Medical Malpractice, Bus. WK., Apr. 22,
1985, at 93, available at 1985 WL 2073256 (stating that some doctors are refusing
to do high-risk procedures because of the greater chance that they might be sued
for malpractice).
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number of medical malpractice claims brought each year. There
are a number of different approaches that state legislatures have
taken to accomplish this goal. Nearly every state has a special statute of limitations for medical negligence actions, requiring the
claim be brought sooner than a claim for other types of negli34
gence. In addition to shortening the statute of limitations, some
states have established damage caps limiting the amount of damages a plaintiff
can receive.35 Other states have mandated binding
•.
36
arbitration. A number of states have imposed screening panels,
both mandato 71 and discretionary, which predetermine whether a
case has merit. Minnesota, along with a number of other states,
requires an affidavit of expert review be submitted with the complaint to demonstrate that an expert believes the plaintiff has a
38
valid claim. The purpose of the Minnesota statute is to reduce the
32. Eleanor D. Kinney, Malpractice Reforms in the 1990s; Past Disappointments,
Future Success?, 20J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 99, 99 (1995) (analyzing tort reform
efforts made by federal and state governments); Feeder, supra note 26, at 948 ("In
response to the medical malpractice insurance 'crisis,' nearly every state enacted
some measure of 'tort reform."'); Qual, supra note 4, at 427 (analyzing different
states' reactions to the increasing amount of medical malpractice litigation); Catherine Yang, Commentary: Tort Reform Needs Reforming, Bus. WK., Apr. 15, 1996, at 67,
available at 1996 WL 7614020 (commenting that "[n]early all 50 states now have
some tort reform in place").
33. Infra notes 34-38 and the accompanying text.
34. Qual, supra note 4, at 427. Forty-one states have statutes in place limiting
the amount of time in which a medical malpractice action can be brought. Id.
The only states that do not have special statutes of limitations of negligence actions are Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Idaho, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia. Id. at n.46. For a discussion on the problems
associated with a shorter statute of limitations in Minnesota see Feeder, supra note
26, at 959-73.
35. Kinney, supra note 32, at 125. The states that have damage caps on the
plaintiffs recovery are: Alaska, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho,
Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia,
West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id.; see also Qual, supra note 4, at 434 (discussing
damage caps).
36. Kinney, supra note 32, at 125. The states that currently have binding arbitration are: Alaska, California, Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana,
Michigan, Mississippi, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, South Dakota, Utah,
and Virginia. Id.; see also Qual, supra note 4, at 429 (discussing the aspects of arbitration).
37. Kinney, supra note 32, at 125. The states that have screening panels are:
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, NewYork,
North Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, and Virginia. Id.; see also Qual, supra note 4, at
430-31 (discussing pre-trial screening panels).
38. FLA. STA. ch. 766.203 (2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-9.1 (2000); 735 ILL.
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cost of medical insurance by preventing frivolous medical malpractice claims. 9
CoMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-622 (West 2000); MICH. COMP. LAwS § 600.2912d (2000);
MINN. STAT. § 145.682 (2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-27 (West 2000); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2305.011 (West 2000); 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1301.821-A (West
2000); R.I GEN. LAWS § 9-19-41 (2000); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
27, § 1661 (2000). See

also Halleland & Mastry, supranote 28, at 17 (analyzing how the Minnesota legislature is attempting to contain the cost of health care); Jeffrey A. Parness & Amy
Leonetti, Expert Opinion Pleading: Any Merit to Special Certificates of Merits?, 1997
B.Y.U. L. REv. 537, 556-62 (1997) (analyzing specifically the medical malpractice
statutes of Illinois, Florida, Virgin Islands, and Georgia); Jeffrey A. Parness et.al.,
The Substantive Elements in the New Special PleadingLaws, 78 NEB. L. REv. 412, 416-17
(1999) (analyzing the medical malpractice statutes of New Jersey and Georgia);
Qual, supranote 4, at 427 (analyzing medical malpractice in Minnesota).
39. MINN. STAT. § 145.682 (2000); Anderson v. United States & Veterans
Admin., No. Civ. 5-96-235 JRT/RLE, 1998 WL 92460, at *3 (D. Minn. Jan. 5,
1998) ("As reflected in its legislative history, the Minnesota Statute we apply was
designed as a substantive gatekeeping mechanism...."); Stroud v. Hennepin
County Med. Ctr., 556 N.W.2d 552, 555 (Minn. 1996) ("[t]he Minnesota legislature
enacted Minn. Stat. § 145.682 for the primary purpose of eliminating nuisance
medical malpractice lawsuits by requiring plaintiffs to file affidavits verifying that
their allegations of malpractice are well-founded"); Sorenson v. St. Paul Ramsey
Med. Ctr., 457 N.W.2d 188, 191 (Minn. 1990)("[t]he legislature contemplated
procedural reform directed at the elimination of 'frivolous' cases."); Canfield v.
Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co., 610 N.W.2d 689, 691-92 (Minn. Ct. App.
2000) (stating that "[t]he Minnesota legislature enacted Minn. Stat. § 145.682...to
prevent frivolous medical malpractice lawsuits by requiring plaintiffs to file expert
affidavits supporting their allegations of malpractice"); Haile v. Sutherland, 598
N.W.2d 424, 427, (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) ("[t]o prevent frivolous medical malpractice claims, the Minnesota legislature enacted Minn. Stat. § 145.682, requiring
plaintiffs to support their medical malpractice claims with affidavits of expert review"); Rozhansky v. Bergstrand, No. C2-87-1951, 1988 WL 12759, at *2 (Minn. Ct.
App. Feb. 23, 1988) (stating that "[s]ection 145.682 was enacted to prevent nuisance medical malpractice suits"); Bastian v. Kane, No. C4-97-2147, 1998 WL
236165, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. May 12, 1998) ("The statute was enacted to eliminate
nuisance lawsuits by requiring plaintiffs to file expert affidavits verifying the merit
of the plaintiffs allegations."); Lindberg v. Health Partners, Inc., No. C2-98-505,
1998 WL 865741, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 1998), rev'd 599 N.W.2d 572
(Minn. 1999) ("The Minnesota legislature enacted Minn. Stat. § 145.682 to eliminate nuisance medical malpractice lawsuits."); Graham v. Lukens, No. C4-97-396,
1997 WL 561260, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 9, 1997) ("Minn. Stat. § 145.682 was
created to eliminate nuisance medical malpractice lawsuits by requiring plaintiffs
to file affidavits by experts supporting their allegations."); Lunzer v. Qualey, No.
C7-97-862, 1997 WL 729226, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 1997) ("The Minnesota
legislature enacted Minn. Stat § 145.682 for the purpose of eliminating nuisance
medical malpractice lawsuits by requiring plaintiffs to file affidavits verifying that
their allegations of malpractice are well-founded."); Lombardo v. Seydow-Weber,
529 N.W.2d 702, 703 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) ("The primary purpose of Minn. Stat. §
145.682 (1992) is to eliminate nuisance malpractice suits."); Nowak v. City of Hutchinson, No. CX-95-1323, 1995 WL 672877, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 14,
1995) (stating that "[t]he main purpose of this statute is to eliminate nuisance
malpractice suits"); Reed v. North Mem'l Med. Ctr., No. C5-91-247, 1991 WL
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B. Minnesota's Medical MalpracticeStatute
Minnesota Statute section 145.682 sets out the procedure to be
used when bringing a medical malpractice claim.40 Before the statute is applied, however, it must first be determined whether the
plaintiff's claim requires expert testimony.4 1 If the plaintiff brings a
prima facie case that does not require expert testimony, this statute
does not apply. However, if expert testimony is required, section
156629, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 20, 1991)(stating that "Minn. Stat. § 145.682
(1988) was enacted by the legislature in 1986 in an effort to reduce frivolous medical malpractice claims"); Parker v. O'Phelan, 414 N.W.2d 534, 537 (Minn. Ct. App.
1987) (stating that "[t]he primary purpose of Minn. Stat. § 145.682 is to eliminate
nuisance malpractice suits by establishing a process where affidavits of expert
review are required to verify the lawsuit's validity"); see also Halleland & Mastry, supra note 28, at 17; Qual, supra note 4, at 427.
40. MINN. STAT. § 145.682 (2000); see generallyEISBERG, supra note 7, at 206-07
(1990) (setting out the standard procedures attorneys use in Minnesota to bring a
medical malpractice claim with expert testimony).
41. MINN. STAT. § 145.682 subd. 2.
42. Id. While expert testimony is not required in every case, most likely a
medical expert will be needed. Tousignant v. St. Louis County, 615 N.W.2d 53, 58
(Minn. 2000) ("There are, however, exceptional cases in which expert testimony is
not necessary." (quoting Sorenson, 457 N.W.2d at 191)); Hestbeck v. Hennepin
County, 297 Minn. 419, 424, 212 N.W.2d 361, 364 (1973) ("[E]xpert testimony is
not necessary where the matters to be proved fall within an area of common
knowledge .... ."). There have only been a few decisions that have allowed a plaintiff's case to proceed without an expert. Tousignant, 615 N.W.2d at 60 (allowing a
claim to proceed in a case where a woman at a nursing home was not properly restrained, causing her to fall and become injured); Canfield v. Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co., 610 N.W.2d 689, 693-94 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (allowing a case to
proceed against an independent medical examiner in which the plaintiff is asserting an assault and battery claim); Black v. Trevilla Nursing Home of New Brighton,
No. C4-91-353, 1991 WL 132756, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. July 23, 1991)(allowing a
claim to proceed against a nursing home for permitting patients access to smoking
material, which caused the plaintiff to die of burn injuries). Many more cases have
required expert witnesses to provide the standard of care. Becker v. Bashioum,
No. C5-98-2359, 1999 WL 343915, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. June 1, 1999) (holding
that an expert witness was needed to determine the amount of damage resulting
from breast implants larger than those consented to by the patient during cosmetic breast surgery); McCollar v. Mayo Clinc, No. CX-97-936, 1997 WL 714743, at
*1 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 18, 1997) (holding that expert testimony was required to
determine whether the doctor performed a nasal antrostomy without gaining the
patient's consent); Bailey v. Sheppard, No. C9-92-1928, 1993 WL 99446, at *2
(Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 6, 1993) (holding that an expert witness is required to bring a
malpractice claim against the Minnesota Security Hospital); Way v. Foley Dental
Office, No. C8-91-1506, 1992 WL 43301, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 10,
1992) (requiring an expert witness to show that the defendant provided improper
dental treatment); Broich v. Springfield Cmty. Hosp., No. C7-92-180, 1992 WL
166789, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. July 21, 1992) (finding that a expert witness was required "to show that some act or omission by the hospital caused [the plaintiffs]
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145.682 is applied.43
Section 145.682 requires the plaintiff to submit two affidavits
identifying an expert to verify that the plaintiffs claim has merit. 44
The first affidavit, served with the complaint, must acknowledge
that an expert has reviewed the claim and that, in the expert's
opinion, there has been a deviation from the applicable standard
of care.4 5 The second, and most important affidavit, which is due
180 days after the commencement of the lawsuit, must be signed by
46
the experts and make three disclosures.
It must identify the exinjuries" where the plaintiff claimed that she coughed up a syringe cap after a hysterectomy); De Antoni v. Lieppman, No. C2-92443, 1992 WL 189329, at *1 (Minn.
Ct. App. Aug. 11, 1992) ("[Elven under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, appellants
had to introduce expert testimony addressing different aspects of ophthalmological surgery...."); K.P.S. v. Auran, No. CO-91-611, 1991 WL 238318, at *1 (Minn. Ct.
App. Nov. 19, 1991) (requiring an expert opinion because "electroshock treatment
is outside a lay person's knowledge"); see also Vakil v. Mayo Clinic, 878 F.2d 238,
239 (8b Cir. 1989) (remanding a case back to the district court to determine
whether an expert opinion is required).
43.

MINN. STAT. § 145.682 subd. 2 (2000).

44. Id. § 145.682. Subdivision 2 of the statute states that:
In an action alleging malpractice, error, mistake, or failure to cure,
whether based on contract or tort, against a health care provider which
includes a cause of action as to which expert testimony is necessary to establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff must: (1) unless otherwise provided in subdivision 3, paragraph (b), serve upon defendant with the
summons and complaint an affidavit as provided in subdivision 3; and (2)
serve upon defendant within 180 days after commencement of the suit an
affidavit as provided by subdivision 4.
Id. at subd. 2.
45. Id. at subd. 3. Subdivision 3 of the statute states that:
The affidavit required by subdivision 2, clause (1), must be by the plaintiffs attorney and state that:
(a) the facts of the case have been reviewed by the plaintiffs attorney
with an expert whose qualifications provide a reasonable expectation that
the expert's opinions could be admissible at trial and that, in the opinion
of this expert, one or more defendants deviated from the applicable
standard of care and by that action cause injury to the plaintiff; or
b) the expert review required by paragraph (a) could not reasonably be
obtained before the action was commenced because of the applicable
statute of limitations. If an affidavit is executed pursuant to this paragraph, the affidavit in paragraph (a) must be served on defendant or the
defendant's counsel within 90 days after service of the summons and
complaint.
Id.; see also Anderson v. Rengachary, 591 N.W.2d 511, 513 (Minn. Ct. App.
1999) (explaining the requirements of Minnesota Statute section 145.682).
46. MINN. STAT. § 145.682 subd. 4(a) (2000). Subdivision 4 of the statute
states:
(a) The affidavit required by subdivision 2, clause (2), must be signed by
each expert listed in the affidavit and by the plaintiffs attorney and state

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2000

9

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 2 [2000], Art. 32
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

1408

[Vol. 27:2

perts likely to testify at trial, the substance of what the experts will
opinion. 4 1
testify about, and a "summary of the grounds for each
The statute also permits the plaintiff to make these disclosures in
answering interrogatories submitted by the defendant. 4s Failure to
comply with section 145.682 results in mandatory dismissal with
49
prejudice of the plaintiff's claim.
C.

Cases InterpretingMinnesota'sStatute
1.

Sorenson v. St. Paul Ramsey Medical Center

The first case that attempted to interpret Minnesota Statute
section 145.682 was Sorenson v. St. Paul Ramsey Medical Center.5" In
Sorenson, the plaintiff, Mrs. Sorenson, brought a medical malpractice claim against doctors who allegedly contributed to the stillbirth
of her son. Mrs. Sorenson obtained legal representation a month
before the statute of limitations was to run.52 Her counsel served a
the identity of each person whom plaintiff expects to call as an expert
witness at trial to testify with respect to the issues of malpractice or causation, the substance of the facts and opinion to which the expert is expected to testify, and a summary of the grounds for each opinion. Answers to interrogatories that state the information required by this
subdivision satisfy the requirements of this subdivision if they are signed
by the plaintiff's attorney and by each expert listed in the answers to interrogatories and served upon the defendant within 180 days after commencement of the suit against the defendant.
(b) The parties or the court for good cause shown, may by agreement,
provide for extensions of the time limits specified in subdivision 2, 3, or
this subdivision. Nothing in this subdivision may be construed to prevent
either party from calling additional expert witnesses or substituting other
expert witnesses.
(c) In any action alleging medical malpractice, all expert interrogatory
answers must be signed by the attorney for the party responding to the
interrogatory and by each expert listed in the answers. The court shall
include in a scheduling order a deadline prior to the close of discovery
for all parties to answer expert interrogatories for all experts to be called
at trial. No additional experts may be called by any party without agreement of the parties or by leave of the court for good cause shown.
Id. at subd. 4; see also Sorenson v. St. Paul Ramsey Med. Ctr., 457 N.W.2d 188, 191
(Minn. 1990) (stating that the second affidavit is the most significant affidavit).
47. MINN. STAT. § 145.682 subd. 4(a) (2000).
48. Id.
49. Id. at subd. 6.
50. 457 N.W.2d 188, 189 (Minn. 1990).
51. Id.
52. Id. Mrs. Sorenson did not learn she had a possible medical malpractice
claim against her doctors until she visited her gynecologist the same year the statute of limitations ran. Id. The statute of limitations for a medical malpractice
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complaint upon the defendants shortly thereafter, along with an
affidavit that satisfied the statutory requirement "indicating that
[plaintiff's attorney] was unable to obtain expert review prior to the
expiration of the statute of limitations....
Two months later, the defendants filed an answer to the complaint and included interrogatories requesting the plaintiff provide
a "specific and detailed description of all facts upon which you base
your allegation [of medical negligence] . Complying with the interrogatories, the plaintiff served a second affidavit
identifying Dr.
• 55
Watson as an expert who would testify at trial.' Following a request
made by the defendants in a motion to compel discovery, the plaintiff then submitted a supplemental affidavit providing a more detailed summary of the testimony Dr. Watson was prepared to give. 56
The defendants withdrew the motion to compel discovery and
waited for the 180-day deadline to expire, at which time the defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted
claim in Minnesota was two years at the time of Sorenson's claim. MINN. STAT. §
541.07 subd. (1) (1992); see also Marshall Tanick, Medical Malpractice Cases Bode Ill
for Claimants, MINN. LAWYER, July 3, 2000 at 11 (describing how the Minnesota
Statute of limitations was expanded from two to four years).
53. Sorenson, 457 N.W.2d at 189; see also MINN. STAT. § 145.682 subd. 3(b)
(2000) (providing an exception when "the expert review required by paragraph (a)
could not reasonably be obtained before the action was commenced because of
the applicable statute of limitations.").
54. Sorenson, 457 N.W.2d at 190. By providing detailed answers to the interrogatories, the plaintiff would have satisfied the requirements of the second affidavit required by Minnesota Statute. MINN. STAT. § 145.682 subd. 4(a).
55. Sorenson, 457 N.W.2d at 190.
56. Id. The plaintiff submitted the supplemental affidavit intending to satisfy
the requirements of Minnesota Statute section 145.658. Id. The affidavit stated
that:
[Upon admission to the hospital, Mrs. Sorenson had]a history of eight
hours of persistent abdominal pain * * *. There was [sic] obvious symptoms of fetal distress and probable abruptial placenta that should have
been identified by nurse-midwife Birch and Dr. Bezidicek [sic]. Each of
them failed to properly evaluate Theresa [sic] Sorenson's condition and
failed to properly care and treat Theresa [sic] Sorenson thereafter.
Shortly thereafter, it should have been apparent that the contractions
were abnormal and that the fetal heart rate was abnormal and that there
should have been timely intervention by a physician but there was not.
At some point in time between 12:25 p.m. and 1:40 p.m., the plaintiff was
also examined by either Dr. Ditmanson or Dr. Koszalka while there were
still viable heart tones for John Sorenson, and they failed to properly diagnose an abruptial placenta and fetal distress and failed to take proper
steps to deliverJohn Sorenson prior to his death.
Id. at 192.
57. Id. at 190; see also MINN. STAT. § 145.682 subd. 6 (2000) (stating that "fail-
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the summary judgment motion.
The Minnesota Supreme Court agreed with the district court
in finding the second affidavit insufficient.59 The court stated that
"it is not enough simply to repeat the facts in the hospital or clinic
record," which is the only information that the plaintiff's affidavit
60
provided. In Sorenson, however, this standard was not applied. 61
The court reasoned that by "withdrawing their pending motion to compel answers to interrogatories, the defendant doctors
were signifying their acceptance of the plaintiffs' answers in satisfaction of the requirements of section 145.682. " 62 Because the
plaintiff was induced to believe that the second affidavit was sufficient, the court ruled that the defendants were estopped from moving for summary judgment.6 '
While estoppel allowed the plaintiff to proceed in this case, the
court stated that it would require future plaintiffs to set out, in detail, the expert's testimony in regards to the applicable standard of
care as well as the acts of the doctor that allegedly breached this
standard of care.6 Although the court required that this strict rule
be strictly applied in future cases, it also noted "there may be less
ure to comply with subdivision 2, clause (2), and subdivision 4 results, upon motion, in mandatory dismissal with prejudice of each cause of action as to which expert testimony is necessary to establish a prima facie case.").
58.

Sorenson, 457 N.W.2d at 191.

59. Id. at 193.
60. Id. at 192.
61. Id. at 193.
62. Id.
63. Id. (relying on Thorson v. Rice County Dist. One Hosp., 437 N.W.2d 410,
416 (Minn. 1989)). Equitable estoppel is:
[t]he doctrine by which a person may be precluded by his act or conduct,
or silence when it is his duty to speak, from asserting a right which he
otherwise would have had....Elements or essentials of such estoppel include change of position for the worse by party asserting estoppel; conduct by party estopped such that it would be contrary to equity and good
conscience for him to allege and prove the truth; false representation or
concealment of facts; ignorance of party asserting estoppel of facts and
absence of opportunity to ascertain them; injury from declarations, acts,
or omissions of party where he permitted to gainsay their truth; intention
that representation should be acted on; knowledge, actual or constructive, or facts by party estopped; misleading person to his prejudice; omission, misconduct or misrepresentation misleading another. It is based on
some affirmative action, by word or conduct, of the person against whom
it is invoked, and some action of the other party, relying on the representation made.
BLACK's LAw DIcTIoNARY 373 (Abr. 6th ed. 1991).
64. Sorenson, 457 N.W.2d at 193.
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drastic alternatives to a procedural dismissal."

2.

Stroud v. Hennepin County Medical Center

The next case that had a significant effect on the interpretation of Minnesota Statute section 145.682 was Stroud v. Hennepin
County Medical Center.66 In this case, the plaintiff brought a medical
malpractice action against the Hennepin County Medical Center
(HCMC) because of their failure to discover a subarachnoid hem67
orrhage.
In Stroud, Ida Stroud had visited the HCMC twice, complaining
of headaches, and was sent home without being given an examination. 6s The third time she visited, it was discovered that she had a
subarachnoid hemorrhage, and she was admitted to the HCMC
where she died within the month. 69
Attempting to comply with Minnesota Statute section 145.682,
Stroud's relatives, as the plaintiffs in the following action, served a
complaint upon the defendants and provided an affidavit recognizing Dr. Tredal as an expert.70 The affidavit of Dr. Tredal stated that
he was aware of the standard of care and that there was "a failure to
diagnose and treat a subarachnoid hemorrhage."7 1 The defendant
then served on the plaintiff a set of interrogatories requesting a
more detailed summary of their expert's conclusion. 72 The plaintiffs answers to the interrogatories referred back to their original
affidavit. 7 Dissatisfied with the plaintiffs response, the defendants,
65. Id. The court in Sorenson provides examples of "less drastic alternatives,"
such as the court authorizing "a deposition of the expert at the plaintiffs expense
or limiting the expert's testimony to those matters adequately disclosed." Id.
66. 556 N.W.2d 552 (Minn. 1996).
67. Stroud, 556 N.W.2d at 553. A subarachnoid hemorrhage is "a bleeding
into the space between the arachnoid and the pia mater. The arachnoid is the
middle of three membranes which cover the brain and the spinal cord. The pia
mater is the innermost of the three membranes." Id. at 553 n.1.
68. Id. at 553.
69. Id. Ida Stroud died of a pulmonary embolism caused by a deep vein
thrombosis resulting from her subarachnoid hemorrhage. Id.
70. Id. at 554; see also MINN. STAT. § 145.682 subd. 4(a) (listing the requirements of the two affidavits needed in medical malpractice claims).
71. Stroud, 556 N.W.2d at 554. The affidavit of Dr. Tredal stated that "I, Dr.
Tredal, will testify that as a result of the breach of the standard of care on 1/1/94
and 1/4/94, as discussed, there was a failure to diagnose and treat a subarachnoid
hemorrhage which ultimately resulted in a complicated hospital course and death
of the Plaintiff." Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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on five different occasions, requested a more detailed explanation.7 4 After the 180-day deadline expired, the defendants then
moved for summary judgment. 5 At that time, the plaintiff finally
amended their answers to the interrogatories, providing sufficient
information. 76 However, the trial court ruled that it was too late
77
and dismissed the action.
The supreme court affirmed the district court's discretion to
dismiss the claim and reasoned the answers to the interrogatories
78
did not satisfy the standard articulated in Sorenson. The responses
failed to "provide an outline of the chain of causation between the
alleged violation of the standard of care and the claimed damages. " 79 The court had initially considered allowing a claim of estoppel to permit the claim to proceed, but the defendant had already given the plaintiff a number of opportunities to amend the
affidavit after the statutory deadline."s The court therefore concluded that justice would not require that the plaintiff be given another chance to amend the affidavit.8'
3.

The Impact Of Sorenson And Stroud

After Sorenson and Stroud, the sufficiency of the second affidavit

74. Id. The defendants first attempted to obtain a more detailed answer to
their interrogatories by serving supplemental interrogatories on November 16,
1994, requesting "full opinion(s) of each expert, including the factual and medical
basis for each, as well as the reasons therefor." Id. The second and third attempts
were letters sent by the defendant on November 29, 1994, andjanuary 9, 1995, requesting that the plaintiffs provide more detail as to their expert's testimony. Id.
The fourth attempt was on March 14, 1995, when the plaintiff was notified that the
defendants intended to bring a summary judgment action. Id. The fifth and final
attempt was a letter sent on March 21, 1995, indicating to the plaintiff "that it
would bring a motion to compel answers to its supplemental interrogatories if they
were not answered by the April 1 discovery cut-off date set by the district court."
Id.
75. Id.; see also MINN. STAT. § 145.682 subd. 2 (1998)(stating that the two
medical malpractice affidavits must be submitted within 180-days after the service
of the complaint).
76. Stroud, 556 N.W.2d at 554. The plaintiffs amended their answers to the
interrogatories after the defendant moved for summary judgment, and they intended to create a situation similar to Sorenson in which the theory of estoppel
would allow the claim to proceed. Id.
77. Id. at 555.
78. Id. at 556.
79. Id. at 556.
80. Id. at 556-57; supra note 38 and the accompanying text.
81. Stroud, 556 N.W.2d at 556.
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2
required by Minnesota Statute section 145.682 was uncertain.s
The court in Sorenson stated that it was strictly applying the statute,
but then allowed a claim to proceed based on estoppel."' Then, in
Stroud, the court again claimed that it was applying the statute
strictly, but it did not consider estoppel because of the poor effort
814
made by the plaintiff to comply with the statute. After these two
supreme court decisions, it was uncertain as to what standard the
court would apply in interpreting Minnesota Statute section

145.682 and when estoppel would allow a claim to advance. 85

Therefore, the court in Lindberg was faced with the task of answering these unresolved questions and determining the fate of the affidavits required in medical malpractice cases."'
III. THE LINDBERG DECISION
A.

The Facts

On March 28, 1994, Ms. Lindberg, several months pregnant,
called her clinic to report swelling in her lower legs." A midwife at
Group Health advised her not to come in, but to keep her next
scheduled appointment three days later.' Early the next morning,
Ms. Lindberg was awakened by severe chest pains, a headache, a
89
tight abdomen, and noticed the baby was not moving. She called
Group Health again to report these conditions, and then called a
half-hour later to report that the conditions were worsening. 90 After the third phone call, she was instructed to go to Fairview Riverside Hospital, where her son was delivered stillborn. 9
On March 25, 1996, Ms. Lindberg commenced this lawsuit
claiming that the clinic was negligent in not instructing •.her
92 to seek
treatment when she first called to report her condition.
Along
with the complaint, she submitted the first of two affidavits re-

82.
(Minn.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Compare Sorenson v. St. Paul Ramsey Med. Ctr., 457 N.W.2d 188, 193
1990), with Stroud, 556 N.W.2d at 556.
Sorenson, 457 N.W.2d at 193.
Stroud, 556 N.W.2d at 556.
Supra note 50-81 and accompanying text.
599 N.W.2d 572 (Minn. 1999).
Lindberg,599 N.W.2d at 573.
Id.
Id. at 574.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2000

15

1414

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 2 [2000], Art. 32
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:2

quired by Minnesota Statute section 145.682. 9' The second affidavit
was submitted on September 20, 1996, about 178 days after the lawsuit had begun.94 The second affidavit identified Dr. Cruikshank as
an expert familiar with the standard of care.9 5 The affidavit stated
that Ms. Lindberg's son probably would not have died if she had
received medical treatment at the time of her first call to Group
Health, and that the child's death was the result of the clinic's neg96
ligence.
In August of 1997, over a year after the lawsuit had begun,
They claimed that
Health Partners moved for a dismissal.97
Lindberg had failed to meet the requirements of Minnesota Statute
section 145.682 by not providing a sufficient affidavit of an expert
98
Two months later, Lindberg supwithin the 180-day deadline.
plied a legally sufficient supplemental affidavit of Dr. Cruikshank.99
However, the district court ruled in favor of Health Partners and
dismissed Lindberg's claim as a result of her failure to provide the

93. Id.; see also MINN. STAT. § 145.682 (2000).
94. Lindberg, 599 N.W.2d at 574.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 575. The complete affidavit states:
1. I am a board-certified specialist in obstetrics and gynecology.
2. This affidavit is to explain my opinions in this case pursuant to
Minn.Stat. § 145.682.
3. I am familiar with the standard and duty of care applicable to doctors,
midwives, nurses and other medical personnel in the Twin Cites of Minnesota area.
4. Based upon a reasonable degree of medical certainty, it is more probable than not, that if, among other things, Debra Lindberg had been instructed to seek medical treatment at the time of her phone call on the
morning of March 28, 1994, Lukas Stewart Lindberg would not have
died.
5. Based upon a reasonable degree of medical certainty, Lukas Stewart
Lindberg died as a result of the negligent and careless conduct of the Defendants and/or their agents and employees, including midwife Sharon
Nichols and Donn [a] Mathiowitz.
6. That the opinions contained in this affidavit, are based upon my years
as a board certified specialist in obstetrics and gynecology, the review of
the medical records concerning Debra Lindberg, my experience in working with patients having similar medical conditions, diagnosis and treatment, and my general familiarity with medical literature.
Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.; see also MINN. STAT. § 145.682 subd. 2 (providing that the affidavits
must be "served upon defendant within 180 days after commencement of the
suit").
99. Lindberg,599 N.W.2d at 575.
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affidavit before the 180-day deadline. 00
B.

The Minnesota Court Of Appeals'Analysis

The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's
summary judgement motion, finding that the September 1996 affidavit was sufficient to meet the requirements of Minnesota Statute
section 145.682.101 The court found that the affidavit satisfied the
most important part of the statute, which was to provide 2the name
of the expert whom the plaintiff intended to use at trial.1
In adhering to Sorenson, the court recognized that the expert's
affidavit must provide a summary of the applicable standard of care
and describe how the acts of the practitioner violated this standard.' ° The court found this to be the weakest segment of the affidavit.1 4 However, under unique circumstances, the basic outline
provided was sufficient in satisfying the requirement.
Furthermore, the court found that allowing the case to proceed conformed
to the judicial preference of allowing a case to be decided upon its
merits.
While the court did not have to consider estoppel because it
found that the affidavit was sufficient in satisfying the statutory requirement, it noted that the defendants did not object to the sufficiency of the affidavit for eleven months.' 7 The court stated that
the "long delay in acting on the statute tends to suggest that the
medical basis for the suit had been sufficiently disclosed to fulfill
the purposes of the statute."'
C.

The Minnesota Supreme Court's Analysis

The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected the Court of Appeals
100. Id. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs claim on a summary judgment motion pursuant to Rule 56. Id.
101. Lindberg v. Health Partners, Inc., No. C2-98-505, 1998 WL 865741, at *2
(Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 1998); see also MINN. STAT. § 145.682.
102. Lindberg, 1998 WL 865741, at *2.
103. Id.; see also Sorenson v. St. Paul Ramsey Med. Ctr., 457 N.W.2d 188, 192
(Minn. 1990) (describing the level of detail need to satisfy the second affidavit).
104. Lindberg, 1998 WL 865741, at 2*.
105. Id.
106. Id.; see also infra note 147 (providing support for the notion that a fundamental concept of the United States legal system is that claims be dismissed on
their merits).
107. Lindberg, 1998 WL 865741, at 2*.

108. Id.
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decision and reinstated the district court's grant of summaryjudgment.'9 The court stated that Minnesota Statute section 145.682
should be strictly adhered to because it is "uncomplicated and unambiguous."' 10
The court applied the standard that was developed in
Sorenson," and which Stroud appeared to be applying.1 2 Following
these cases, the court interpreted Minnesota Statute section
145.682 as requiring "far more information than simply identification of the expert.. .or a 'general disclosure.'

3

The court rea-

soned that by strictly following the statute, it "cuts with a sharp but
clean edge" and relieves the confusion in future cases.114
In the present case, the court held that the September 1996 affidavit was "broad" and contained merely "conclusory statements as
to causation." 11 The court also denied Lindberg's claim of estoppel, stating that the burden of supplying the affidavit was on the
plaintiff, and that it was not the responsibility of the defendant to
object to the adequacy of the plaintiffs affidavit." 6
109. Lindberg v. Health Partners, Inc., 599 N.W.2d 572, 578 (Minn. 1999).
110. Id. at 577; see also MINN. STAT. § 145.682 (2000).
111. Sorenson v. St. Paul Ramsey Med. Ctr., 457 N.W.2d 188 (Minn. 1990); see
also supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
112. Stroud v. Hennepin County Med. Ctr., 556 N.W.2d 552 (Minn. 1996); see
also supra notes 70-81 and accompanying text.
113. Lindberg, 599 N.W.2d at 578; see also MINN. STAT. § 145.682 (2000).
114. Lindberg, 599 N.W.2d at 578. Contra Anderson v. Rengachary, 608 N.W.2d
843 (Minn. 2000) (Anderson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Injustice Anderson's dissenting opinion, he comments on this quote by stating "[i]n
essence, the majority's decision transforms this statute from a shield against unwarranted medical malpractice litigation into a sword that will be used to prematurely cut off actions with a 'sharp but clean edge' before it can be properly determined whether they should be disposed of on the merits." Id. at 852
(Anderson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Lindberg, 599
N.W.2d at 578).
115. Lindberg, 559 N.W.2d at 578.
116. Id. In rejecting Lindberg's estoppel claim, the court stated "failure of defendant to prove plaintiffs claim is frivolous or failure of defendant to alert plaintiff to the inadequacy of the affidavit of expert identification will not excuse orjustify an affidavit or expert identification falling short of the substantive disclosure
requirement." Id. Since the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision on September
2, 1999, the Minnesota courts have heard seven cases addressing Minnesota Statute section 145.682. The first case decided after Lindberg was Tousignant v. St.
Louis County, 602 N.W.2d 882 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999). In this case, the court dismissed a claim of medical malpractice because the plaintiffs affidavit did not set
forth the applicable standard of care and was not signed by the plaintiffs attorney.
Tousignant, 602 N.W.2d at 886; see also infra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
However, the Minnesota Supreme Court found a prima facie case of malpractice,
therefore the expert affidavit was unnecessary and the appellate court was over-
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ConcurringAnd Dissenting Opinions

turned. Tousignant v. St. Louis County, 615 N.W.2d 53 (Minn. 2000). The next
case decided by a Minnesota court was Ellingson v. Walgreen Co., 78 F. Supp. 2d
965 (D. Minn. 1999). The court in Ellingson dismissed a claim because the plaintiff's affidavits were not submitted before the 180-day deadline. Ellingson, 78 F.
Supp. 2d at 969. The court of appeals decided the next case, Palmer v. Erlandson,
No. C8-99-891, 2000 WL 2621 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 27, 1999). In this case, the
court deemed the plaintiffs affidavit insufficient and refused to allow the claim to
continue under the theory of estoppel or excusable neglect. Id. at *5. Recently,
on March 16, 2000, the Minnesota Supreme Court again analyzed Minnesota Statute section 145.682. See generally Anderson v. Rengachary, 608 N.W.2d 843 (Minn.
2000). In Anderson, the plaintiff brought a medical malpractice claim against Dr.
Rengachary, who performed an anterior cervical diskectomy on Anderson. Id. at
844. Anderson claimed that the defendant's negligence "caused a severed vagus
nerve and swelling of her esophagus and thyroid." Id. at 845. Shortly after filing
the complaint, the plaintiff furnished both of the affidavits required by Minnesota
Statutes section 145.682. Id. In the second affidavit, the plaintiff identified Dr.
Goodman as her expert, who stated that the surgeon violated the standard of care
by not staying clear of the esophagus and the vagus nerve. Id. After the 180-day
deadline had expired, the defendant moved for summary judgment. Id. The
Minnesota Supreme Court found that the plaintiffs affidavit was insufficient because "it did not clearly set forth the standard of care, the defendant's acts or
omissions that allegedly violated that standard, and the chain of causation between
these violations and the plaintiffs injuries." Id. at 848. The court also rejected the
argument that the plaintiff should be allowed an opportunity to amend her affidavit and proceed with her claim. Id. at 849. The court relied on Lindberg to find
that the defendant does not have to object to the adequacy of the affidavit in order
to move for summary judgment after the 180-day deadline has expired. Id. In
Anderson, the plaintiff had an opportunity to submit sufficient affidavits, but failed
to do so. Id. at 850. Therefore, nothing prevented the defendant from succeeding in a summary judgment motion. Id. The majority's opinion was not unanimous. Justice Paul H. Anderson andJustice Gilbert wrote sharply worded dissents
criticizing the harsh result of the court. Id. at 851-53.Justice Anderson stated that
while it is true that the affidavit was insufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement
imposed by Minnesota Statute section 145.682, the plaintiff should have been
granted an opportunity to amend the affidavit and proceed with the valid claim.
Id. at 851. Justice Gilbert, however, was disturbed by the legislature's infringement
on the court's power to make its own rules of court. Id. at 852. Gilbert believed
that under constitutional separation of powers only the Minnesota Supreme Court
had the power to enact procedural rules. Id. at 852-53; see also infra notes 188-94
and accompanying text; Barbra L. Jones, Dismissal Over Expert Affidavit Defects O,
MINN. LAWYER, Mar. 20, 2000, at 1, 13 (analyzing the court's decision). For the
next case addressing section 145.682, see House v. Kelbel, 105 F. Supp. 2d 1045(D.
Minn. 2000). In this case, the court examined section 145.682 to determine legislative intent behind section 554.42 pleadings. Id. at 1051; see also infranotes 175-87
and accompanying text. One of the most recent cases decided by a Minnesota
court was Canfield v. Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co., 610 N.W.2d 689 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2000). In this case, the plaintiff brought a medical malpractice claim against
a doctor who had performed an independent medical exam. Id. at 690-91. The
court held that section 145.682 does not apply to an independent medical exam
and allowed the case to proceed. Id. at 694.
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The court wrote three opinions in Lindberg.'17 Justice Paul H.
Anderson wrote a concurring opinion and Justice Gilbert wrote an
opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part with the majority's decision. 18 Justice Anderson believed the language used in the
majority's opinion was too harsh, and he expressed concerns about
the future implications that the opinion could have. 1 9 While the
majority believed that there was a "sharp edge" as to what is to be
considered sufficient
in120analyzing affidavits required by Minnesota
•
Statute section 145.682, Anderson believed that there are borderline cases in which less drastic alternatives than a procedural dismissal should be employed.
However, Anderson found that the
present case was not to be considered
borderline and that the
2
claim had properly been dismissed. 1
Justice Gilbert agreed with the majority and Justice Anderson,
finding that the affidavit submitted by the plaintiff failed to satisfy
Minnesota Statute section 145.682. 12 However, unlike Justice
Anderson, Justice Gilbert believed that this was a borderline case
that deserved a "less drastic alternative" than a procedural dismissal. 24 He considered it a borderline case because the plaintiff
made an honest attempt to satisfy the statute by "retain[ing] a
qualified expert and mak[ing] a good faith effort to disclose meaningful information of what the expert testimony would be.,

125

Jus-

117. Lindberg, 599 N.W.2d at 579 (Paul H. Anderson, J., concurring specially) (Gilbert, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
118. Id.
119. Id. Justice Paul H. Anderson disagreed with the majority opinion because
they stated that the statute was "uncomplicated and unambiguous." Id. at 579.
Anderson worried the majority's strong language would encourage future courts
to act harshly when considering the sufficiency of affidavits required by Minnesota
Statute section 145.682. Id. at 579.
120. Lindberg, 599 N.W.2d at 579. The majority opinion found that the statute
"cuts with a sharp but clean edge." Id. at 578. In the majority's opinion, the affidavit either satisfied the requirement of Minnesota Statute section 145.682, or else
the case should be dismissed. Id.; see also supra note 114 and accompanying text
(quotingJustice Anderson disagreeing with the majority's contention that the statute has a "sharp edge").
121. Id. at 579. Justice Anderson is conveying the idea first articulated in
Sorenson. Sorenson, 457 N.W.2d at 193. In Sorenson, the court stated that it would
apply "less drastic alternatives" when it was faced with a borderline case. Id.; see
also supra note 65 and accompanying text (setting out the "less drastic alternative"
mentioned by the court).
122. Lindberg, 599 N.W.2d at 579.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 580.
125. Id.
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tice Gilbert suggested that in borderline cases, the plaintiffs claim
should be allowed to proceed unless the defendant can show that
prejudice will result from doing so.26
IV. THE ANALYSIS
A.

The Lindberg Holding

One of the most essential components of our legal system is
that a case be decided upon its merits,
and that it not be dismissed
127
as a result of a procedural flaw.
Dismissing a case on a procedural error is the most "punitive sanction" that can be imposed on
a party for not complying with a procedural rule, and it should only
be used as a last resort and under "exceptional circumstances."'18
126. Id. In forming his opinion,Justice Gilbert relied on Dennie v. Metropolitan
Medical Center,387 N.W.2d 401 (Minn. 1986), which was decided before Minnesota
Statute section 145.682 was enacted. Lindberg, 599 N.W.2d at 580. In Dennie, the
plaintiff did not respond to interrogatories until after the discovery deadline had
expired. Dennie, 387 N.W.2d at 403. The defendant then sought to suppress the
testimony of an expert who would testify at trial as to the defendant's negligence
because the interrogatories inquiring about this testimony were answered in an
untimely manner. Id. at 404. The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected the defendant's motion. Id. The court stated that "[t] he defense has the burden of showing particular prejudice of such a character that some substantial right or advantage will be lost or endangered if plaintiff is permitted to dismiss and reinstitute
the action." Id. at 405. (quoting Firoved v. General Motors Corp., 277 Minn. 278,
283-84, 152 N.W.2d 364, 368 (1967)). Therefore, because the defendant could
not show any prejudice they had incurred by receiving the answers to the interrogatories after the discovery deadline had expired, and because they could have
anticipated what the expert's testimony would be, the court allowed plaintiffs'
claim to proceed. Id. at 407.
127. Anderson v. United States & Veterans Admin., No. Civ. 5-96-235, 1998 WL
92460, at *4 (D. Minn. Jan. 5, 1998) (stating that malpractice claims, should be decided, if at all possible, on the merits); Sorenson, 457 N.W.2d at 192 ("the primary
objective of the law is to dispose of cases on the merits"); Dennie v. Metropolitan
Medical Center, 387 N.W.2d 401, 404 (Minn. 1986) ("[a]n order of dismissal on
procedural grounds runs counter to the primary objective of the law to dispose of
cases on the merits"); Lunzer v. Qualey, No. C7-97-862, 1997 WL 729226, at *1
(Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 1997) ("[t]he primary objective of the law is to dispose of
cases on their merits"); Henke v. Dunham, 450 N.W.2d 595, 598 (Minn. Ct. App
1990) (quoting Firoved v. Gen. Motors Corp., 277 Minn. 278, 283, 152 N.W.2d 364,
368 (1967) that "the primary objective of the law [is] to dispose of cases on the
merits"); Rozhansky v. Bergstrand, No. C2-87-1951, 1988 WL 12759, at *2 (Minn.
Ct. App. Feb. 23, 1998) ("dismissal on procedural grounds runs counter to the
primary objective of the law to hear cases on their merits and should be granted
only under exceptional circumstances"); Parker v. O'Phelan, 414 N.W.2d 534, 537
(Minn. Ct. App. 1987) ("The policy behind the rules of civil procedure, however, is
to try cases on the merits and seek ajust determination of every action.").
128. Dennie v. Metro. Med. Ctr., 387 N.W.2d 401, 404 (Minn. 1986); see also
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However, the holding in Lindberg departs demonstratively from this
basic notion of justice and is setting the
precedent for cases with
29
merit to be dismissed on technicalities.
In an effort to create a distinctive test to judge what a plaintiff
must include in their affidavit, the Minnesota Supreme Court went
too far. 3 0 Before Lindberg, courts were more apt to allow plaintiffs

to have their day in court.'' However, after the Lindberg decision,
there have been a number of cases in which lower courts have hesitantly applied the Lindberg standard, denying medical malpractice
claimants the judgments to which they are entitled.
An example
of this is the case of Tousignant v. St. Louis County."' In this case,
the Court of Appeals is forced to dismiss a claim that is "clearly not
frivolous," denying a plaintiff recovery because the affidavit was not
signed by the plaintiffs experts and the court did not believe the
supra note 126 and the accompanying text. Justice Gilbert saw Minnesota Statute
section 145.682 as being a reversion back to code pleading. Anderson, 608 N.W.2d
at 852 (Gilbert, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). "The statute was
never meant to require plaintiffs in medical malpractice cases to literally try their
cases in pre-trial affidavits." Id. at 853.
129. Anderson, 608 N.W.2d at 851 (Anderson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that the majority's opinion is departing from deciding
cases on their merits).
130. Lindberg, 599 N.W.2d at 579 (Anderson, J., concurring specially). Justice
Anderson believes that the court has gone too far and expresses concern about the
future implications of the decision. Id.
131. E.g., Graham v. Lukens, No. C4-97-396, 1997 WL 561260, at *1 (Minn. Ct.
App. Sept. 9, 1997) (noting that the district court provided the plaintiff with a 90day extension to complete the expert affidavit required by Minnesota Statute section 145.682); Lunzer, 1997 WL 729226, at *1 (reversing the district court in finding that a questionable affidavit was sufficient in satisfying section 145.682); Gile v.
City of St. Paul, No. C7-92-163, 1992 WL 153360, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. July 7,
1992) (stating that the trial court allowed the plaintiff to have an extra 30 days to
complete affidavits after the statutory deadline had expired); Holmquest v. Hanson, No. C9-92-598, 1992 WL 196213, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 18, 1992) (noting
that the trial court twice gave the plaintiff additional time to comply with section
145.682 after a summaryjudgment hearing); K.P.S. v. Auran, No. CO-91-611, 1991
WL 238318, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 1991)(stating that the plaintiff "was
granted two extensions to submit a second affidavit adequate to meet statutory requirements"); Simon, 1987 WL 28912, at *1 (remanding a claim to the trial court to
consider granting a continuance).
132. E.g., Ellingson, 78 F. Supp. 2d 965 (D. Minn. 1999) (dismissing a claim
against a pharmacy for mistakenly giving the wrong prescription to the plaintiff);
Palmer v. Erlandson, No. C8-99-891, 2000 WL 2621, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 27,
1999) (dismissing a claim of dental malpractice, even though the parties had
agreed to mediation); Haile v. Sutherland, 598 N.W.2d 424 (Minn. Ct. App.
1999) (dismissing a claim in which a doctor mistakenly removed part of the plaintiff's breast instead of a mass on the plaintiff's chest wall).
133. 602 N.W.2d 882 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999).
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34
affidavit to be sufficient.
While procedural dismissals may be appropriate in cases where
the plaintiff makes no effort to comply with the statute and supplies
no expert witness at all, 1 5 there should be alternatives in "border-

134. Id. at 887. The plaintiff was not placed in the proper restraints after undergoing hip replacement surgery, causing the hip to be further injured. The
court dismissed the claim because the affidavit of the expert did not supply
enough detail and the witness failed to sign the affidavits. Id. The Minnesota Supreme Court recently overruled the lower court, but not because of any of the
concerns articulated in this article. Tousignant v. St. Louis County, 615 N.W.2d 53
(Minn. 2000). The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs claim of negligence
did not require an expert witness, therefore, the claim is allowed to proceed. Id. at
61. However, in dicta, the court stated "[w]e agree with the conclusions of the
lower courts that Tousignant's affidavit was deficient." Id. at 60. By allowing this
claim to proceed under a new theory, the court was able to overturn an unquestionably harsh dismissal and leave the Lindbergstandard undisturbed. It is uncertain as to whether the court will employ such tactics in future litigation.
135. E.g., Carmen v. Mayo Found., 81 F.3d 165, 1996 WL 137272, at **1 (8th
Cir. 1996) (dismissing the plaintiff's claim because the plaintiff did not submit an
affidavit); Bellecourt v. United States, 994 F.2d 427, 430 (8th Cir. 1993) (dismissing
the plaintiffs claim because no expert affidavit was submitted to the court);
Anderson v. United States, No. Civ. 5-96-235JRT/RLE, 1998 WL 92460, at *2 (D.
Minn. Jan. 5, 1998) (dismissing the claim "because the plaintiffs have yet to serve
the defendants with an expert disclosure affidavit"); Wall v. Fairview Hosp. and
Healthcare Servs., 584 N.W.2d 395, 405 (Minn. 1998) (dismissing malpractice
claims because the affidavits did not establish the appropriate standard of care);
Becker v. Bashioum, No. C5-98-2359, 1999 WL 343915, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. June
1, 1999) (dismissing a claim because the plaintiff's affidavits did not meet statutory
requirements); Graham v. Day, No. C9-97-1513, 1998 WL 113974, at *2 (Minn. Ct.
App. Mar. 17, 1998) (dismissing a claim because the affidavit was not from the
plaintiff's attorney); McCollar v. Mayo Clinic, No. CX-97-936, 1997 WL 714743, at
*1 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 18, 1997) (dismissing a claim because the plaintiff failed
to provide an expert); Addington v. Allina Health Sys., No. C7-97-1039, 1997 WL
729132, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 1997) (dismissing a claim because the affidavit was first submitted "over 14 months after the case was commenced"); Nered
v. Schafihausen, No. C2-95-2580, 1996 WL 363391, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. July 2,
1996) (dismissing a claim because the plaintiffs expert was not qualified); Stavn v.
Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Minn., No. C7-96-1449, 1996 WL 745261, at *2
(Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 31, 1996) (dismissing a claim because the plaintiff did not
provide the required affidavits); Gustin v. Minneapolis Children's Med. Ctr., No.
C1-94-2561, 1995 WL 465422, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 1995) (dismissing the
case with prejudice when plaintiff failed to file the second affidavit because they
could not find a suitable expert); Nowak v. City of Hutchinson, No. CX-95-1323,
1995 WL 672877, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 14, 1995) (dismissing a claim because
no expert affidavit was provided); Paulos v. Johnson, No. C6-93-1931, 1994 WL
111091, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 1994) (dismissing a claim because only a personal affidavit was supplied); Bailey v. Sheppard, No. C9-92-1928, 1993 WL 99446,
at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 6, 1993) (dismissing a claim because the plaintiff states
that he did not intend on calling any witnesses at trial);Jamnick v. Walgreen's Co.,
No. C1-92-1499, 1993 WL 19708, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App.Jan. 25, 1993) (dismissing a
claim because plaintiffs "affidavits and ... answers to interrogatories failed to es-
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line" cases, or cases in which a plaintiff has made an effort to com136
ply with Minnesota Statute section 145.682.
A logical approach
would be to follow the pattern set in Sorenson and Stroud.' In these
cases, the court applied the statute strictly, but then applied estoppel in order to reach a just outcome.1ss In accomplishing this type
of result, the courts have three tools at their disposal that they can
utilize in implementing justice. 9
B.

Possible Ways Of Expanding The Statute
1.

Good Cause Shown

The first tool that the courts have at their disposal, to be applied before the 180-day statutory deadline, is written into Minnesota Statute section 145.682.140 This is evidence of the legislature
attempting to avoid unjust outcomes such as the decision in

tablish that a qualified expert witness could present evidence of causation"); Gile
v. City of St. Paul, 1992 WL 153360, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. July 7, 1992) (dismissing
a claim because the "affidavit was submitted 14 months after appellant commenced her action"); De Antoni v. Lieppman, No. C2-92-443, 1992 WL 189329, at
*1 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 1992) (dismissing a claim because plaintiff failed to
provide expert affidavits); Reed for Heirs of Robins v. N. Mem'l Med. Ctr., No. C591-247, 1991 WL 156629, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 20, 1991) (dismissing a claim
because the expert affidavit was submitted after the statutory due date); Maloney v.
Fairview Cmty. Hosp., 451 N.W.2d 237, 240 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (dismissing a
claim because the plaintiff's affidavit was not received by the defendant until six
months after the statutory deadline); Reed v. Hennepin County Med. Complex,
No. C9-90-1200, 1990 WL 152681, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 16, 1990) (dismissing
the plaintiff's claim because "appellant failed to provide an affidavit of expert review"); Chizmadia v. Smiley's Point Clinic, 428 N.W.2d 459, 460 (Minn. Ct. App.
1988) (dismissing the plaintiffs claim because plaintiff could not find an expert
who would support plaintiffs claim). As seen in the number of cases that get dismissed prior to trial, Minnesota Statute section 145.682 fulfills its purpose in reducing frivolous malpractice claims. Supra note 39 and accompanying text.
136. Sorenson v. St. Paul Med. Ctr., 457 N.W.2d 188, 193 (Minn. 1990); see also
MINN. STAT. § 145.682 (2000).
137. Supra notes 50-74 and accompanying text.
138. E.g., Sorenson, 457 N.W.2d at 193 (allowing a claim to proceed that had
not fully satisfied the statutory requirement); Thorson v. Rice County Dist. One
Hosp., 437 N.W.2d 410, 416 (Minn. 1989) (allowing a claim to proceed because the
defendant continued to discuss settlement possibilities after the statutory deadline); Parker v. O'Phelan, 414 N.W.2d 534, 537 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (granting
that the plaintiff be given an extension of time to file an expert affidavit).
139. Anderson v. Rengachary, 608 N.W.2d 843, 850 (Minn. 2000) (stating the
elements of excusable neglect); Palmer v. Erlandson, No. C8-99-891, 2000 WL
2621, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 27, 1999) (stating the elements of estoppel).
140. MINN. STAT. § 145.682 (2000).
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Lindberg. Minnesota Statute section 145.682 states that "the court
for good cause shown, may by agreement, provide for extensions of
the time

limits.

1 42

The legislature put no limits on the court's

power in interpreting what "good cause shown" means, allowing
the courts to extend the 180-day deadline wheneverjustice requires
it.

43

Consequently, if the courts want to interpret this statute

strictly, they must then interpret the idea of "good cause" liberally
to comply with the legislature's intent.44
2.

Excusable Neglect

The next tool that the courts have, excusable neglect, can be
applied either before or after the statute's 180-day deadline has expired. 45 The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that excusable
neglect is eligible to be applied, according to Rule 6.02 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure. 46 Rule 602 states that "when by
141. Lindberg v. Health Partners, Inc., 599 N.W.2d 572, 579 (Minn.
1999) (Gilbert, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
142. MINN. STAT. § 145.682, subd. 4(b) (2000) ("The parties or the court for
good cause shown, may by agreement, provide for extensions of the time limits
specified in subdivision 2,3, or this subdivision. Nothing in this subdivision may be
construed to prevent either party from calling additional expert witnesses or substituting other expert witnesses." Id.
143. Id.; see also Simon v. Univ. of Minn. Sch. of Dentistry, No. C7-87-1315,
1987 WL 28912, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 1987). In Simon, the court of appeals remanded the plaintiff's claim back to the district court to decide whether
justice would require that the plaintiff receive a continuance to submit expert affidavits, the court further noted that "continuances should be liberally granted."
Simon, 1987 WL 28912, at *1.
144. Id.
145. Stern v. Dill, 442 N.W.2d 322, 324 (Minn. 1989) (stating that "[t]he statute
does not specify that extensions may only be granted before the expiration of the
180 days"). Excusable neglect is defined as:
In practice, and particularly with reference to the setting aside of a
judgment taken against a party through his "excusable neglect," this
means a failure to take the proper steps at the proper time, not in consequence of some unexpected or unavoidable hindrance or accident, or reliance on the care and vigilance of his counsel or on promises made by
the adverse party. As used in rule (e.g. Fed.R.Civil P. 6(b)) authorizing
court to permit an act to be done after expiration of the time within
which under the rules such act was required to be done, where failure to
act was the result of "excusable neglect", quoted phrase is ordinarily understood to be the act of a reasonable prudent person under the same
circumstances.
BLACK's LAw DIcrIONARY393 (Abr. 6th ed. 1991).
146. Stern, 442 N.W.2d at 324. In determining whether excusable neglect
would be eligible for application, the court examined Rule 81.01 (c) which stated
that "all statutes 'inconsistent or in conflict with these rules are superceded insofar
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statute.. .an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a
specified time, the court for cause shown may, at any time in its discretion.. .permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the
result of excusable neglect.", 47 In considering the elements establishing excusable neglect, the court expects plaintiff "(1) has a reasonable suit on the merits, (2) has a reasonable excuse for failure
to comply with the time limit set forth by [statute], (3) acted with
due diligence after receiving notice of the time limit, and (4) no
substantial prejudice results to the defendant." 14 If the plaintiff has
made a real effort to bring a medical malpractice
claim, she most
• 149
likely will satisfy the elements of excusable neglect.
On a number of occasions, Minnesota courts have considered
applying excusable neglect to allow a plaintiffs claim to proceed
when the plaintiff's expert affidavit was deficient or when, forjustifiable cause, no affidavit was submitted. 150 However, the Minnesota
courts have been reluctant in applying this tool. 5 1 The case that
as they apply to pleading, practice, and procedure in the district court.'" Id.
(quoting MINN. R. Civ. P. 81.01(c)). The court then determined that the time limits set by Minnesota Statute section 145.682 were procedural and allowed excusable neglect to be employed according to Rule 6.02 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil
Procedure. Id.
147. MINN. R. Crv. P. 6.02. The full rule states that:
When by statute, by these rules, by notice given thereunder, or by order
of court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified
time, the court for cause shown may, at any time in its discretion, (1) with
or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if request therefore is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or
as extended by a previous order, or (2) upon motion made after the expiration of the specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect.
Id.
148. Anderson v. Rengachary, 608 N.W.2d 843, 850 (Minn. 2000) (setting out
the elements of excusable neglect).
149. Parker v. O'Phelan, 414 N.W.2d 534, 537 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
150. E.g., Henke v. Dunham, 450 N.W.2d 595, 598 (Minn. Ct. App.
1990) (allowing a claim to proceed under excusable neglect even though plaintiff's
expert affidavit was approximately 60 days late); Stern, 442 N.W.2d at 232 (allowing
a claim to proceed even though expert affidavit was untimely); see also supra note
148 and accompanying text.
151. E.g., Bellecourt v. United States, 994 F.2d 427, 432 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating
that the "appellant did not establish excusable neglect for his failure to timely file
the required expert affidavits); Anderson v. United States & Veterans Admin., No.
Civ. 5-96-235, 1998 WL 92460, at *4 (D. Minn. Jan. 5, 1998) (dismissing a request
for a time extension because the plaintiff did not act in "due diligence"); Anderson,
608 N.W.2d at 850 (dismissing a excusable neglect claim because the plaintiff did
not make such a motion to the trial court); Moen v. Mikhail, 454 N.W.2d 422, 422
(Minn. 1990) (dismissing request for an extension of time because plaintiff "pro-
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first applied excusable neglect to allow a claim to proceed was
Parker v. O'Phelan.151 In this case, the plaintiff's original attorney
3
submitted a complaint, but did not include the expert affidavit.
Then, after the defendant made a request for "an affidavit of expert review," the original attorney referred the plaintiff to another
attorney, who made a request for additional time to satisfy the
affidavit. 1
The request was denied and the second law firm
declined further representation of the plaintiff. 155 The plaintiff
then retained a third lawyer, who properly submitted the affidavit.
However, the time limit had already run. 56 The court of appeals
found this to be a case in which excusable neglect would allow the
claim to proceed.15 The court found that the plaintiff had a valid
claim, had a reasonable excuse for the delay, acted diligently in
filing the affidavit, therefore, allowing the claim to proceed did not
prejudice the defendant. 15 By applying excusable neglect liberally,
as was done in Parker,courts have another opportunity to ensure
that a valid medical malpractice case receives its day in court.159
vided no reasonable excuse for his failure to provide the requisite affidavits in a
timely fashion"); Palmer v. Erlandson, No. C8-99-891, 2000 WL 2621, at *5 (Minn.
Ct. App. Dec. 27, 1999) (denying an extension of time because the plaintiff did not
provide a reasonable excuse for initially failing to submit the required affidavit);
K.P.S. v. Auran, No. CO-91-611, 1991 WL 238318, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 19,
1991) (dismissing a motion to vacate ajudgment for excusable neglect because the
plaintiff "gave the court no basis upon which to find her neglect excusable"); Reed
for Heirs of Robins v. North Mem'l Med. Ctr., No. C5-91-247, 1991 WL 156629, at
*2 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 20, 1991)(dismissing a claim because the plaintiff did not
show a reasonable excuse for not initially submitting required expert affidavit);
Maloney v. Fairview Cmty. Hosp., 451 N.W.2d 237, 240 (Minn. Ct. App.
1990) (affirming the dismissal of claims because "appellant never requested or
made a motion for an extension of time within which to satisfy the statute").
152. 414 N.W.2d 534 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
153. Id. at 535.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 535-36.
156. Id. at 536.
157. Id. at 537.
158. Id. at 537. In applying the elements of excusable neglect to the facts of
the case, the court first focused on validity of the affidavit. Id. The court found
that, although the plaintiff submitted a valid affidavit after the statutory deadline,
the case had merit, thereby satisfying the first requirement of excusable neglect.
Id. The court then found that the confusion resulting from the plaintiff having to
seek different council was an excusable reason for delay, satisfying the second requirement. Id. at 538. The court then stated that "[r]espondents finally retained
their present counsel, who expeditiously obtained and served upon [the defendant] the necessary affidavit," fulfilling the third requirement. Id. Lastly, the
court found that "the delay did not prejudice [the defendant's] defense on the
merits." Id.
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valid medical malpractice case receives its day in court.' 59 Furthermore, if the court does employ excusable neglect and the plaintiff
is given more time to comply with the details of the statute, the
purpose of the statute, eliminating frivolous claims, is not harmed
because the claim ultimately will not proceed to trial unless there is
an expert witness. 16°
3.

Estoppel

A third tool accessible to the courts is estoppel.
In the past,
courts applied estoppel in a way that put the burden on the defendant to object to the plaintiffs affidavit if the defendant believed
162
the affidavit was insufficient.
Estoppel was used as such so that a
defendant who received the plaintiffs affidavit could not wait until
after the 180-day statutory deadline to move for summary judg163
ment.
159. Id. at 538.
160. Palmer v. Erlandson, 2000 WL 2621, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 27, 1999).
161. Id. Palmersets out the elements of estoppel stating:
[tio establish a claim of estoppel, [the plaintiff] ha[s] the burden of
proving that (1) [the defendant] knowingly misrepresented a material
fact; (2) [the defendant] intended to induce action as a result of the misrepresentation; (3) they lacked knowledge of the true facts; and (4) they
relied upon [the defendant's] misrepresentation to their detriment.
Id.; see also supra note 151 and accompanying text.
162. The first case that allowed a plaintiff to proceed with a medical malpractice claim, even though the plaintiff did not submit an affidavit, was Thorson v.
Rice County Dist. One Hosp., 437 N.W.2d 410 (Minn. 1989). Supra note 164 and
accompanying text. The Minnesota Supreme Court also allowed an insufficient
claim to proceed in Sorenson. Sorenson v. St. Paul Ramsey Med. Ctr., 457 N.W.2d
188, 193. In this case, the defendant withdrew a motion to compel discovery,
which caused the plaintiffs to believe that their affidavit was sufficient. Id.; see also
supra note 40-55 and accompanying text (providing an analysis of the court's decision). Another case where the court considered allowing estoppel to extend a
plaintiff's claim was Stroud. Stroud v. Hennepin County Med. Ctr., 556 N.W.2d
552, 556 (Minn. 1996). In Stroud, however, the plaintiff already had a number of
opportunities to provide sufficient affidavits and the court found that it would be
unjust to give the plaintiff another chance. Id.; see also supra note 56-71 and accompanying text (analyzing the courts decision). While most of the above mentioned decisions have allowed the plaintiffs claim to proceed under estoppel,
there have also been a few courts, besides Stroud, that rejected the application of
estoppel. E.g., Stavn v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Minn., No. C7-96-1449, 1996
WL 745261, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 31, 1996) (refusing to apply estoppel because the defendant did not act in a way that would make the plaintiff believe that
the defendant accepted the plaintiffs affidavit); Maloney v. Fairview Cmty. Hosp.,
451 N.W.2d 237, 241 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (refusing to apply estoppel because
the plaintiff did not raise this issue with the trial court).
163. Sorenson, 457 N.W.2d at 193.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol27/iss2/32

28

2000]

Leo: Torts—Medical Malpractice: The Legislature's Attempt to Prevent C
LINDBERG V. HEALTH PARTNERS, INC.

1427

The first case that applied the theory of estoppel to allow a
claim to proceed was Thorson v. Rice County District One Hosptal6
In this case, the plaintiff acquired a new attorney after the 180-day
statutory deadline had expired. 6 5 The attorney contacted the defendant's attorney, who stated that "he was interested in discussing
setdement without incurring additional expenses relative to extensive discovery," and the two attorneys kept in contact.'66 The plaintiff then proceeded to find an expert and submitted answers to interrogatories that would have satisfied the requirements of
Minnesota Statute section 145.682.67 At that point in time, the
defendants sought that the claim be dismissed because the affidavit
was not submitted prior to the statutory deadline. 168 The court rejected the motion, finding that the defendants should have informed the plaintiff earlier if they intended to seek dismissal according to the running of the 180-day deadline. 169 The court stated
that the defendants' attorney "remained silent at times it would
have been normal for them to have asserted the hospital's statutory
right to claim a mandatory dismissal."' 76 Therefore, the court
found that the defendants' silence was acceptance of having a decision based on the merits, which allowed the plaintiffs claim to proceed.' 7 '
While estoppel can be a powerful tool ensuring that cases are
decided on their merits, as in Thorson, the Lindberg decision almost
completely removed estoppel applicability.'
In Lindberg, the Min164. 437 N.W.2d 410 (Minn. 1989).
165. Id. at 413.
166. Id. By stating that they wanted to settle the case, the defendants' attorney
caused the plaintiff to believe the case would not be dismissed even though no expert affidavit had been submitted yet. Id. The plaintiff believed the court would
decide the case on its merits and continual contact between his attorney and the
defendants' attorneys confirmed this belief, as a result, the plaintiff spent time and
money finding an expert and preparing a case. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 414.
169. Id. at 415.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Lindberg v. Health Partners, Inc., 599 N.W.2d 572, 578 (Minn. 1999).
Accord Palmer v,Erlandson, No. C8-99-891, 2000 WL 2621, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App.
Dec. 27, 1999), (relying on Lindberg, the court of appeals denied the plaintiff's request that a claim be continued under the theory of estoppel). The facts of Palmer
are similar to Thorson in that the plaintiff and defendant were involved in settlement discussions and had chosen a mediator. Id. at *2.Then, when the statutory
deadline had run, the defendant moved for dismissal. Id. The court upheld the
dismissal, by placing emphasis on the elements of estoppel that required the de-
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nesota Supreme Court stated that "failure of defendant to alert
plaintiff to the inadequacy of the affidavit of expert identification
will not excuse orjustiy an affidavit of expert identification falling
short of the substantive disclosure requirement.""' By not allowing
the plaintiff in Lindberg to claim estoppel, the defendant, who did
not question the plaintiffs affidavit for eleven months, effectively
had the case dismissed after the 180-day statuary deadline had
run. 74 In the end, a plaintiff can never feel safe. Even after submitting an affidavit that the plaintiff believes meets the statutory
requirements, the defendant could attempt to oppose the affidavit
at any time and escape having to defend against a valid claim.
C. Minnesota Statute Section 544.42
In 1997, the Minnesota legislature enacted Minnesota Statute
section 544.42,
a..plaintiff brings a malprac. .
..which is to apply when
175
tice claim against a professional.
This statute is very similar to
section 145.682, which was used as a blue print in drafting section
544.42.176 However, there is one significant difference in the statutes that favors plaintiffs bringing malpractice claims. 177 Subdivision 6(c) of section 544.42 provides the plaintiff bringing the claim
an additional sixty days to amend their second affidavit if the court
finds it insufficient.
Furthermore, the court specifically notifies
fendant to purposefully mislead the plaintiff. Id. at *4. The court held that the
defendant "had no obligation to inform [the plaintiff] that they were required to
serve an affidavit of expert identification." Id. at *5. Therefore, because the time
limit had expired and the plaintiff had submitted no affidavits, the court dismissed
the claim. Id.
173. Lindberg, 599 N.W.2d at 578.
174. Id. at 575.
175. MINN. STAT. § 544.42 (1998). The statute defines a professional as a "licensed attorney or an architect, certified public accountant, engineer, land surveyor, or landscape architect...." Id. § 544.42 subd. 1 (1).
176. House v. Kelbel, F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1051 (D. Minn. 2000). The timing requirement for submitting the affidavits under sections 142.682 and section 544.42
are identical. Id.
177. Id.
178. MINN. STAT. § 544.42 subd. 6(c). Subdivision 6(c) states that:
Failure to comply with subdivision 4 results, upon motion, in mandatory
dismissal of each action with prejudice as to which expert testimony is
necessary to establish a prima facie case, provided that an initial motion
to dismiss an action under this paragraph based upon claimed deficiencies of the affidavit or answers to interrogatories shall not be granted
unless, after notice by the court, the nonmoving party is given 60 days to
satisfy the disclosure requirements in subdivision 4. In providing its notice, the court shall issue specific findings as to the deficiencies of the af-
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the plaintiff as to what it deems to be insufficient." 9 The legislature
purposefully added this subdivision to avoid the harsh ramifications
they believed resulted from enforcing section 145.682.180 Initially
the legislature considered amending Minnesota Statute section
145.682,
T to medical malpractice, to include profes•applies
181
•
• which
•
sional malpractice.
However, to avoid valid claims from being
dismissed as a result of technicalities, the legislature created a new
statute to "provide the claimant with an opportunity to supplement
and proceed with the case for a determination on the
the affidavit
1
m erits. 12
The legislature had finally recognized the problems that exist
with Minnesota Statute section 145.682.183 Unfortunately for victims of medical malpractice, unlike victims of legal malpractice, the
problems have not been corrected.184 The legislature should abandon section 145.682 and allow all malpractice claims, whether
against doctors or other professionals, to be governed by statute
section 544.42. By allowing the plaintiff in a medical malpractice
claim to have an additional sixty days, the purpose of sections5
'
145.682, preventing claims without merit, will not be jeopardized.
This is noted by the court in House v. Kelbel,'sb stating that "[t]his
procedure allows for cases to be determined on the merits while
still providing a way to prevent frivolous suits from being heard." 87
Therefore, because section 544.42 satisfies the purpose to prevent
frivolous cases and allow cases to be heard on the merits, no reason
exists that this statute should not apply in all malpractice cases. A
plaintiff in a medical malpractice case should be allowed the same
opportunity as a plaintiff in any other malpractice litigation to
fidavit or answers to interrogatories.
Id.
179. Id.
180. House, 105 F. Supp. 2d at 1053 (relying on Appendix: Senate Judiciary
Committee Hearing on Senate File 627, March 25, 1997, p. 13-19, 27; HouseJudiciary Committee: Civil and Family Law Division, April 4, 1997, p. 51-54, 59-60).
181. Id. (relying on Appendix: SenateJudiciary Committee Hearing at p. 18).
182. Id.
183. Id. (relying on Appendix: Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing at p. 1319, 27; House Judiciary Committee at 1997, p. 51-54, 59-60). The court stated that
"[t]he legislative hearing on § 544.42 makes it clear that the legislature sought to
remedy the problems caused in the application of § 145.682." Id.
184. MINN. STAT. § 544.42 subd. 1(1) (providing that legal malpractice is governed by section 554.42).
185. Supra note 39 and accompanying text.
186. 105 F. Supp. 2d 1045 (D. Minn. 2000).
187. Id.at 1054.
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achieve ajust result.
D. ConstitutionalArgument
Potentially a plaintiff could also escape the narrow confinements of Minnesota
Statute
section 145.682 if this statute were
S
18818
•
found unconstitutional.
This argument has been raised before,""
but it has never been challenged as violating the constitutional
separation of powers doctrine or imposing on the inherent power
of the court to establish its own procedural rules.9 In Anderson,
Justice Gilbert insists that 'Judicial procedures.. .are inherently in
the province of the judiciary."19' Gilbert argues that the court already has established rules for a plaintiff to follow when bringing a
claim, and that the legislature has infringed on these rules by enacting section 145.682.192 If Gilbert is correct, this statute would
violate the constitutional separation of powers doctrine and the
statute would be found unconstitutional. 93 After acknowledging
that this argument has never been raised, Gilbert states that "this
188. Anderson v. Rengachary, 608 N.W.2d 843, 853 (Minn. 2000) (Gilbert, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
189. One of the first challenges of the constitutionality of section 145.682 was
whether it violated the equal protection doctrine. Henke v. Dunham, 450 N.W.2d
595, 598 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990). The court applied the rational basis test, questioning whether the statute served a legitimate purpose, and whether the statute
promoted that purpose. Id. The court ruled that a legitimate purpose, to reduce
medical malpractice claims, was served and that the statute "promoted" this purpose. Id. Another general constitutional challenge of the statute was made in Way
v.Foley Dental Office, No. C8-91-1506, 1992 WL 43301, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar.
10, 1992). However, in this case the challenge was denied because the plaintiff did
not notify the attorney general, as was required by Rule 24.04 of the Minnesota
Rules of Civil Procedure. Way, 1992 WL 43301, at *3. The constitutionality of the
statute was also challenged on the grounds that it violated the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. Carmen v. Mayo Found., No. 95-2559, 1996 WL 137272,
at **I (8th Cir. Mar. 26, 1996). The court denied this challenge, stating that, "we
see no merit to the contention that a party who has failed to present a prima facie
case has a right to ajury trial." Id.
190. Anderson, 608 N.W.2d at 853 (Gilbert, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
191. Id. at 852.
192. Id. at 852-53. Gilbert argues that certain rules were in place before the
enactment of section 145.682, including Minnesota Rules of Evidence 702, 703,
and 706. Id. These rules relate to expert opinions. Id. at 853. Other established
Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure rules include: (1) 26.02(d) relating to depositions and discovery of experts; (2) 35.04 relating to medical expert disclosure and
depositions; (3) 4.01 and 8.01 governing summons and complaints; and (4) 7.01
relating to pleadings. Id.
193. Id. at 853.
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question should give this court pause before adopting the legislature's directives in such a wholesale fashion when this legislation
94
may be at odds with our long established precedent and rules.'
V.

CONCLUSION

In the 1996 presidential debates over tort reform, President
Clinton stated that reformation efforts "must aim to deter frivolous
claims without denying justice for claims with merit.' ' 95 In Lindberg,
however, the Minnesota Supreme Court does just the opposite. In
attempting to establish a clear standard as to what is required in the
affidavit of an expert witness according to Minnesota Statute section 145.682, the Court greatly restricts the power of courts to
reach ajust decision. Without expanding estoppel, cases with merit
will be dismissed on technicalities.

194.
195.

Id.
Parness & Leonetti, supra note 38, at 578.
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